Center for Legal Reform v. Rakowsky (Lawyers Weekly No. 002-231-14, 10 pp.) (Joseph Anderson Jr., J.) 3:14-cv-01674; D.S.C.
Holding: Plaintiff is not a party to the contract at issue, and plaintiff’s mere allegation that it is the successor-in-interest to one of the parties does not show that plaintiff has standing to enforce the contract.
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
Even if plaintiff had standing, its claims would be time-barred. Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, bad faith, intentional misrepresentation, and conversion are all subject to a three-year statute of limitations. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that its alleged predecessor-in-interest, Resolution Settlement Corp. (RSC) “had concern about the actions of Defendant” in the fall of 2006. Plaintiff was aware of the settlement of the underlying lawsuit by 2008. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant breached his contractual obligations in August 2008. However, plaintiff did not file suit against defendant until December of 2012, well over four years later.
Although South Carolina has adopted the continuing tort doctrine in limited situations involving nuisance actions, South Carolina courts have declined to adopt the continuing tort rule in other instances. Plaintiff has failed to point to any binding case law that establishes the doctrine’s use by South Carolina courts in factual scenarios similar to those presented in this case. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the South Carolina statute of limitations.
Furthermore, the defendant-attorney is not a party to the underlying litigation-funding contract. It is axiomatic that in order to be held liable for breach of contract, a defendant must be a party to that contract. Despite the many briefs filed in response to this motion, plaintiff failed to address this fundamental flaw in its case.
Motion granted.
